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Mixed-Race Looks
  Ronald Sundstrom 
Abstract
The multiracial population is growing larger and so is popular
awareness about multiracial or mixed-race identity. Simmering
beneath the growing public recognition of multiracial identity are
questions about the legitimacy of mixed race, multiracial, or
biracial as social categories, and further questions about the
ethics and politics of those identities. Behind some of these
questions are worries about how multiracial identity interacts with
racialized aesthetic standards. This essay addresses these issues
by investigating whether those affirmations are racist and betray
monoracial groups. This essay concludes that such affirmations
are not necessarily racist or traitorous. Instead, they are
consistent with modern expressions of individuality, and arise
from self-assertions of personal authenticity and autonomy. All
the same, these affirmations and assertions do risk participating
in, and contributing to, racist aesthetic standards. The arguments
presented in this essay are part of a broader project on mixed
race and the ethics of identity.
Key Words
biracial, ethnicity, interracial, mixed race, multiracial, race
theory, race, racism, racial aesthetics
Am I to be cursed forever with becoming
somebody else on the way to myself?
~ Audre Lorde
1. Introduction
The multiracial population is growing larger and so is popular
awareness about multiracial or mixed-race identity. A major
aspect of this identity and its social history is the meaning
invested in mixed-race looks, in various societies, over time.
Mixed-race looks are simply pivotal to multiracialism. [1] Popular
conceptions of race associate skin color and other somatic
features, such as hair texture, with racial divisions, so the
somatic ambiguity of multiracial persons has attracted attention
in those locales where racial categorization has been active and
been the subject of curiosity, attraction, and fear. This is
consistent with the considerable concern in the history of race
with interracial sex and racial aesthetics. For multiracial persons,
mixed-race looks and the meanings those looks have been
assigned through the ages have been at the center of their
experience and distinguish their experience from that of persons
who come from monoethnoracial or bi-religious families. So much
attention is given to mixed-race looks that some multiracial
individuals experience being reduced to the very fact of their
being mixed; they are treated as embodiments of the sexual
crossing of racial boundaries and taboos.
The difficulty of being multiracial and living with mixed-race looks
should not be exaggerated. There are places in the world were
being multiracial is not exceptional and mixed-race looks are not
exotic. Yet research shows that even in places where multiracial
persons are common, such as in the United States, this identity
and its relation to the way race is commonly practiced present
psychological and social challenges for multiracial persons. [2]
This essay considers two ethical aspects of those challenges. The
first is how the affirmation of mixed-race looks is an expression
of personal authenticity and autonomy, and is linked to the
loosely organized movement to gain public recognition of
multiracial identities. [3] The other is whether those affirmations
are a betrayal of monoracial groups.
These two lines of investigation do not exhaust the ways in which
the subject of mixed-race looks may be a topic of moral
evaluation. Indeed, the older, fearful obsession in the United
States with non-whites, and especially blacks, passing as whites
and thus misrepresenting their racial looks, had a moral
dimension. The act of passing could be judged as dishonest or,
more pointedly, as a failure to “come out” and declare one’s
association and solidarity with the non-white group to which one
“really” belongs. Negative judgments of racial passing given by
white society, however, were self-serving in that the white
majority expected honesty about racial identity for the sake of
preserving race-based social injustices and privileges. It has been
often noted that what the United States was concerned about
was not racial purity per se, since it cared not a whit about the
racial purity of non-white groups, but the conservation of the
white-dominated state. Such judgments against passing were
motivated by racism and stand in contrast with the solidarity-
based judgments against passing. From either perspective,
however, the object of evaluation was the act of passing and the
misrepresentation of ambiguous racial looks. In contrast, the
object of this essay is to ethically evaluate the affirmation of
mixed-race looks.
Engaging the topic of mixed-race looks in this way is significant
because it illustrates issues at the heart of the ethics of identity,
such as recognition, authenticity, autonomy, individuality, and
solidarity, and their interaction with self-presentation and
aesthetic standards formed around major social categories. What
is more, the topic of mixed-race looks is an especially rich case
for two additional reasons. First, it involves racial identification,
one of the most challenging issues for the ethics of identity,
especially in those contexts such as the United States where race
is a principal social category. Second, multiracial identities are at
the crux of the ethical and political issues concerning racial
identities (for example, whether there is an authentic way of
being a member of a racial group) and may challenge or
reinforce traditional racial categories and folk beliefs about race.
This engagement begins by briefly surveying the history of the
“problems” of interracial sex and mixed-race looks and why they
have been conceived as threatening and thrilling in the first
place. It concludes that although the affirmation of mixed-race
looks is burdened by historical problems that make it morally
fraught, it is not necessarily traitorous if engaged in responsibly.
All the same, the affirmation of mixed-race looks, along with
multiracial identity, will inevitably evoke feelings of betrayal and
disappointment. To this, the paper recommends responding with
compassion, listening, and an additional affirmation: the
affirmation to be responsible without sacrificing autonomous
expressions of one’s personal multiracial identity.
2. The Devil Will Make a Grandsire of You
Attention to the sexuality of mixed-race looks is not extraneous.
It has been a remarkable feature of the response to the mixing
of peoples since European commentators first imagined that what
was being mixed were wholly different kinds of people and later
races. A wonderful example of this is the eighteenth century
Spanish Casta paintings of parents, who are depicted as types of
people from different parts of the Spanish Empire (i.e., Spain,
Africa, and the New World) and their offspring, who are depicted
as types that result from those blends (i.e., from a Spaniard and
Indian comes a Mestizo/a). Although these painters and the ideas
that inspired them did not use the idea of race, as that was fully
developed only in the late eighteenth century, they did make
careful records of the results of various pairings and attempted to
pictorially explain the origins of various mixed bodies that the
Spanish termed criollos, mestizos, castizos, mulattoes, albinos,
coyotes, and lobos (see Figures 1 and 2). [4]
Figure 1. De Español y India Produce Mestiza. Unknown artist,
circa 1780, oil on canvas, 38 X 52 cm. Collection of Malú and
Alejandra Escandón, Mexico City.
Figure 2. De Negro y Española sale Mulato. Unknown artist, circa
1780, oil on canvas, 38 X 52 cm. Collection of Malú and Alejandra
Escandón, Mexico City.
The curiosity about color and the results of mixing is also
displayed in the opening scene of Shakespeare’s Othello. Iago
yells to Brabantio that his daughter, Desdemona, has run away
with the Moor, Othello. Iago warns Brabantio that,
Your heart is burst, you have lost half your soul;
Even now, now, very now, an old black ram
Is tupping your white ewe. Arise, arise;
Awake the snorting citizens with the bell,
Or else the devil will make a grandsire of you… [5]
Brabantio’s fear that his “white” daughter will be “tupped” by an
“old black” Moor and Iago’s exploitation of that fear, as depicted
in the play, are more indicative of English rather than
Renaissance Venetian attitudes toward the mixing of peoples. Yet
the depiction in that scene of fear, disgust, and alarm (being
made a grandparent by the devil!) foreshadows the prurient
moral ambivalence toward miscegenation that will bloom in the
eighteenth century in the United States, France, and the
German-speaking states.
The initial shades of this bloom are apparent in François Bernier’s
use of the term “race,” which for some historians marks an early
stage in its development as a modern concept. [6] Bernier,
unlike Brabantio, was not repelled by tupping across the color
line. He was openly fascinated with the relative beauty of women
who were “produced” by mixing whom colonialism and slave
trading made increasingly accessible. Race, gender, sexuality,
and exploitation come together in his travelogue, and the
ambiguous skin tones and facial features of multiracial women
feature prominently in his delighted musings. Bernier, like the
Spanish, was curious about the mixing of peoples, but unlike
them he had a nascent racial ideology, which led him to think
that these mixings were remarkable, not only for their novelty,
but because they occurred across what he believed were natural
categories of people.
François-Marie Voltaire, however, would have shared Brabantio’s
alarm. He accepted the growing view that “race” marked natural
and deep divisions between humanity, so much so that different
races were as distinct as species. Unlike the Spanish, who
acknowledged the possibility of mixing and who produced
portraits of its results, Voltaire believed racial mixing was
unnatural and doubted that progeny from interracial unions could
be fertile. For him, the products of miscegenation were like mules
and belonged to a “bastard race.” [7]
Not that there were no doubts about mestizaje in Latin America,
the Carribean, and in Mexico. There was ambivalence and
outright rejection of it in those places too, but among the Spanish
and French in the New World interracial union was so widespread
that it was the norm. However, even with a liberal attitude
toward racial mixing, practices of racial prejudice and domination
developed. So mestizaje, its Portuguese variant mestiçagem, or
its French variant mestissage, should not be mistaken as a
sufficient sign of racial equality and fairness. As critics of the
myth of Latin American “racial democracy” attest, although an
aesthetic taste for mestizaje developed, it only produced a
rhetoric of, rather than real, racial democracy.
In the English colonies in America and then in the early republic
there existed a similar ambivalence. Although some approved of
Native American and white unions for the beautiful, vigorous
people they would produce, black and white pairings were widely
condemned as a threat to the natural, moral, and political order.
Indicative of this view is Jefferson’s publicly stated repugnance to
miscegenation, which he makes after considering whether blacks
should be incorporated into the state:
The first difference which strikes us is that of colour.
Whether the black of the negro resides in the
reticular membrane between the skin and scarf-
skin, or in the scarf-skin itself; whether it proceeds
from the colour of blood, the colour of the bile, or
from that of some other secretion, the difference is
fixed in nature, and is as real as if its seat and
cause were better known to us. And is this
difference of no importance? Is it not the foundation
of a greater or less share of beauty in the two
races? Are not the fine mixtures of red and white,
the expressions of every passion by greater or less
suffusions of colour in the one, preferable to that
eternal monotony, which reigns in the countenances,
that immovable veil of black which covers all the
emotions of the other race? Add to these, flowing
hair, a more elegant symmetry of form, their own
judgment, in favour of the whites, declared by their
preference of them, as uniformly as is the
preference of the Oranootan for the black women
over those of his own species. The circumstance of
superior beauty, is thought worthy attention in the
propagation of our horses, dogs, and other domestic
animals; why not in that of man? [8]
This oft-quoted passage contains all the essential elements: The
idea that the difference between blacks and whites is natural and
deeply embedded in the skin; that black skin is ugly,
monotonous, and a sign of a base character; and that white
women are so superior in their beauty that black men prefer
them just as orang-outangs prefer black women—the implication
being that interracial sexual desire is driven by the lust of the
inferior for the superior. To allow the “inferior” to openly and
equally mix with the “superior” was a proposition that Jefferson
would not publicly admit. He recognized that allowing blacks to
be part of the body politic would all but invite them into the
American family. [9] Both would be utterly transformed, both
would be miscegenated. That, according to him, was anathema.
Although the particulars of the objection to miscegenation were
to change, the taboo against it dominated racial practices of the
United States until the 1967 U.S. Supreme Court decision of
Loving vs. The State of Virginia. For example, here is what the
trial judge, whose position was ultimately overturned by Loving,
stated when he handed down the conviction against Mildred Jeter
and Richard Loving and ordered them out of the state of Virginia:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow,
malay and red, and he placed them on separate
continents. And but for the interference with his
arrangement there would be no cause for such
marriages. The fact that he separated the races
shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.
[10]
A great irony about that statement, and the expressed views of
Voltaire and Jefferson, is that, as the Spanish admitted,
interracial sex was common and was not a result of the “animal”
desires of the colonized and enslaved; rather the widespread
practice was a result of the desires of the powerful and the
opportunities they had to force and otherwise encourage sexual
relations. In short, widespread miscegenation was not the result
of black men acting like orang-outangs satisfying their desire for
an aesthetically superior woman; it was the result of the desire
of white men. Jefferson knew this very well. Despite his public
declarations against the possibility of a mixed blood nation, his
home and life were miscegenated. He had a long-term romantic
relationship with his slave, Sally Hemmings, with whom he
fathered several children. [11]
Times have changed. Now one can find hundreds if not
thousands of images from advertisements in glossy fashion
magazines broadcasting the idea that mixed-race looks are
everything but monstrous or monotonous. Clothing and cosmetic
corporations utilize these images for many reasons, yet surely
they do so because multiracial models have a beauty that is
judged both exotic and widely appealing. Their very ambiguity is
a visible hook to grab the attention of the consumer and,
likewise, their ambiguity allows individuals from different groups,
different target markets, to relate to them.
Another reason that images of mixed-race looks are utilized is
the social and political idealism that is associated with mixed-
race looks. The idea here is that within multiracial people the
ethnoracial tensions of our societies are resolved in their beautiful
faces, that the very fact of their being blended, mixed, their being
a product of mestizaje or creolization, is a model for larger forms
of harmonization. This is an amazingly naive idea but it is popular
and reoccurring. [12]
Both of these approaches are explicit in the famously
miscegenated images used in the advertising campaigns of
United Colors of Benetton. [13] The company’s slogan “United
Colors” seems to say it all: the somatic blending of mixed race is
a sign of future racial concord, and intercourse and intermarriage
are principal vehicles for reaching that utopia. What was
anathema to Jefferson has now become a cosmopolitan ideal.
[14]
3. Four Women
This ideal, however, is in the form of a corporate slogan used to
peddle clothing. And that has given cause for some to worry.
They are concerned that mixed-race looks are being objectified,
fetishized, and commodified. [15] Commodification, despite the
appearance of inclusion that occurs with it, does not herald the
erosion of racial categories or freedom from racial standards of
comportment and mores, what Anthony Appiah has insightfully
called racial scripts. Instead, especially from the critical vantage
point of the cultural critic bell hooks, it is a way for white-
supremacist society to appropriate and dominate that difference
—to eat the other. [16] The advertising industry produces a
glamorous, overtly sexualized stereotype that reinforces socially
detrimental folk beliefs about race and offers this image up for
general consumption. These representations feed off the idea of
miscegenation as both taboo and alluring, and contribute to
views of multiracial persons, especially women, as exotic,
permissive, and available, as if they are permanently marked by,
and are fated to reenact the social drama of racial forbidden fruit.
Additionally, in the view of those opposed to current expressions
of multiracial identity, typically members of monoracial groups
who are interested in conserving American racial categories, the
reception of mixed-race looks by advertising agencies exposes
what this growing identity is about: the opportunities that come
with racial skin privilege. [17] The final section will return to how
corporate commodification of mixed-race looks affects the ethics
of multiracial identity, but meanwhile a related objection is worth
considering because it gets to three points at the heart of the
accusation, which is that the celebration of mixed-race looks is
parasitic on anti-black racism, neglects the history of race, and
betrays traditional monoracial nonwhite communities.
First, mixed race looks are celebrated precisely because of racist
beliefs about the aesthetic inferiority of non-whites, and in
particular the aesthetic inferiority of blacks. In such an anti-black
atmosphere people are judged by their distance from blackness
and nearness to whiteness, and while for much of U.S. history
any sign of blackness was enough to make you publicly
undesirable (but, as was the case with Sally Hemmings, privately
desirable), now in post-civil rights America a hint of color makes
you not only desirable but acceptable as well. [18]
Second, celebrations of mixed-race looks also blithely ignore the
history of the production of mixed-race categories and its
regulative role in systems of racial domination. These critics
believe that racial mixture in the Americas is largely the result of
rape, and mixed-race identities, such as creole, mulatto, or
mestizo, were used to divide and manage conquered, enslaved,
or colonized populations. [19]
Third, given the history of mixed-race, those who participate in
its celebration and profit from its looks not only forget history but
additionally betray the communities with which they share a
common historical burden of racism. They engage in a behavior
that evolved from the older, potentially traitorous practice of
racial passing. [20] There is a triple play in this betrayal: First,
those who fully racially pass, or take up a multiracial identity,
dissociate themselves from their darker, non-white kin. Second,
by escaping their darker kin they eschew a collective solution to
the racial domination and seek a personal solution. [21] Third,
through their dissociation from their darker kin and community
they reinforce what they sought to escape in the first place, thus
making it that much harder for those whom they have turned
their backs on.
Nina Simone’s song, “Four Women” helps to illustrate this triple
play and the three former points. The lyrics of her song tell a
story of four black women, “Aunt Sarah, Siffronia, Sweet Thing,
and Peaches,” whose skin tones differ but whose experiences are
united in their experience of racism and sexism or, more
accurately, sexualized racism or racialized sexism. Their skin
tones represent gradations of their common experience of racism
and sexism and, more to the point, the gradations of their skin
tone are the direct result of suffering from racist sexual
exploitation. You get this point from what she sang about two of
the women:
My skin is yellow
My hair is long
Between two worlds
I do belong
My father was rich and white
He forced my mother late one night
What do they call me
My name is Siffronia
My skin is tan
My hair's alright, it's fine
My hips invite you
And my lips are like wine
Whose little girl am I?
Well yours if you have some money to buy
What do they call me
My name is Sweet Thing [22]
The celebrants of mixed-race looks are inattentive to the history
that Simone sang about. They are inattentive, as well, to the
moral demand within her song for solidarity and the rejection of
racialized sexual exploitation. This inattentiveness, from the
perspective of monoracial non-white groups, seems to be willful
ignorance and is like rubbing salt in their pre-existing wounds. It
is as if, if you will, the descendants of Siffronia and Sweet Thing,
and maybe even Peaches, have forgotten that they suffer under
the same sexualized racism as Aunt Sarah, refuse to work
collectively to remove that burden, and, what is worse, contribute
to Aunt Sarah’s burden by supporting an ethnoracial social and
aesthetic hierarchy that demeans and devalues her in body and
person!
4. Ethno-Ambiguo Hostility Syndrome
As these charges are considered, it is important to understand
that, from the perspective of multiracial persons, their distinctive
looks may be a source of personal confusion and anxiety. Their
desire to make note of their difference within their families,
communities, and in the public sphere may be more about their
desire to come to terms with their visible difference and to
respond to exclusion and to the stereotypes mentioned above
than it is about an ahistorical celebration of their skin tones or a
mere repetition of the practice of passing. [23]
Their affirmations of being and looking multiracial are more
charitably thought of as expressions of personal authenticity that
result from personal and family narratives: They are claims about
their particular experiences, self-conceptions, life plans, and what
it means to exist ethically as multiracial persons. Moreover, most
certainly have no racist intentions; rather, they see their
assertions as a response to the production of monoracial
categories that they see as poorly suited for themselves and
significant portions of the population.
Concerns about the confusion that multiracial persons experience,
which are related to the three worries and triple dynamics of
racial betrayal described above, were illustrated by Aaron
McGruder in his syndicated comic strip, Boondocks. In a series
devoted to exploring the character Jazmine’s self-conception of
her black-white biracial identity, the character Huey accuses
Jazmine of having “Afro-Denial” when she claims that she has
“good hair” and not an Afro (see figure 3).
Figure 3. The Boondocks (c) 2006 Aaron McGruder. Reprinted by
permission of Universal Press Syndicate. All rights reserved.
Jazmine angrily reacts to his diagnoses, so Huey adds to it a
diagnosis of “Ethno-Ambiguo Hostility Syndrome”—a jocular
reference to the angst that is commonly assumed to arise from
the “marginality” that multiracial persons experience. [24]
Jazmine’s hostile denial evokes the self-deprecation that results
when anti-black representations in various mediums, what bell
hooks calls the “colonizing gaze,” are adopted by blacks and
turned inward. An instance of this gaze in Jazmine’s life is
depicted in her exchanges and friendship with the character
Cindy, a girl whose only knowledge of African Americans is
through media stereotypes and the negative attitudes of her
father. She is excited that blacks are moving into her suburb, and
shares with Jazmine, whom she does not recognize as black, her
hope that the blacks that are moving in will be gangster rappers
and basketball players, as well as her father’s fears about
declining property values, juvenile delinquents, and set-aside
programs. Jazmine reacts to this assault of stereotypes with a
sad and satirical response of “lucky you.” [25] In Black Looks,
Hooks portrays the effects of this gaze in a reflection about a
troubled girl, who, together with her parents, is from a “once
colonized black island:”
Their little girl is just reaching that stage of
preadolescent life where we become obsessed with
our image, with how we look and how others see us.
Her skin is dark. Her hair chemically straightened.
Not only is she fundamentally convinced that
straightened hair is more beautiful than curly, kinky,
natural hair, she believes that lighter skin makes
one more worthy, more valuable in the eyes of
others. Despite her parents’ effort to raise their
children in an affirming black context, she has
internalized white supremacist values and
aesthetics, a way of looking and seeing the world
that negates her value. [26]
Hooks’ phrase “negates her value” pinpoints the destructive force
of the colonizing gaze and, insofar as the one-drop rule
dominates and the Jazmines of the world can only be black, how
that gaze results in the negation of simply being. The sharpest
and perhaps most elucidating portrayal of this desolation of self-
respect is in Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye in which Pecola, the
little black girl who experiences the ravages of racism and
misogyny, “wanted to rise up out of the pit of her blackness and
see the world with blue eyes.” [27]
Huey’s prescription for Jazmine’s denial and hostility is “positive
Nubian reinforcement” so that she will accept the natural beauty
of her hair and achieve “Afrocentric wellness.” Put next to
Morrison’s depiction of Pecola, Huey’s response seems silly, if not
inadequate. Well, Huey is a cartoon character and supposed to be
silly but, despite the silliness, Huey’s response is also serious and
is derived from a tradition of antiracist aestheticism that grapples
with this destructive problem and that encourages the spectators
of society’s anti-black representations to create oppositional
gazes that fight back against the colonizing gaze.
McGruder’s comic portrayal of the conflict between Jazmine and
Huey over her self-conception is a hilarious critique of multiracial
identity. Whatever was McGruder’s intended message for this
particular series, it makes light of both Jazmine’s rejection of any
association with black somatic features and Huey’s Afrocentric
popular psychology. All the same, Huey’s diagnosis may not be
accurate, and the cases of Jazmine, the girl in hook’s reflections,
and Morrison’s Pecola may not be strictly analogous. It is not
clear that Jazmine wants to escape or “rise out of the pit” of her
blackness; likewise, it is not the case that every black-white
biracial person, much less other sorts of multiracial individuals
who claim multiracial identity or affirm their mixed-race looks,
are merely repeating, in their own way, the turmoil of Pecola.
Although those who are committed to the oppositional gaze that
Huey represents may react with incredulity, multiracial persons
may have reasons independent of internalized racism for
affirming mixed-race looks.
The humorous conflict between Huey and Jazmine culminates in a
strip that highlights this stalemate. Jazmine compares her biracial
experience, its specialness and loneliness, to a trite image of a
lonely, special yellow flower surrounded by red roses. Huey
responds to this flight of fancy by telling Jazmine that she is black
and should just get over it.
5. The Individual Is Sovereign
Whether the reader was supposed to take Huey seriously or not,
his brusque response reflects a portion of popular opinion about
this matter. [28] To be fair, his curt statement may have been
meant to serve as an intellectual wake-up call, or a koan, that
delivers the message of antiracist aestheticism in a compact
package. On the other hand, his comment carries the charge that
Jazmine, and multiracial persons generally, are in denial and that
they should accept the identity that society ascribes to them.
This judgment, however, need not stand. One response to this
opinion is that it is a statistical stereotype about multiracial
persons, and it is a great error to see all multiracial individuals,
or even all black-white biracial individuals, as simple versions of
Jazmine, or worse, Pecola. Many multiracial individuals do not
suffer from internal feelings of disconnection and enjoy the
experience of being multiracial. In those cases there is nothing
for them “to get over.”
However, the partisans of Huey’s position may respond that,
even if multiracial individuals do not experience the loneliness
and disconnection that Jazmine reports, they should, since they
are, as Huey put it, delusional about their “real” ethnoracial
identity. This is the bedrock of the argument because Huey is
making an ethical claim that relies on the normative stereotype
that members of a race should act according to the group’s
ascribed racial script (appropriately reconstructed within the
group). Specifically, his claim is that Jazmine should accept her
association with blackness out of self-respect and solidarity with
African Americans. Boondocks has too much fun with popular
opinions and representations of racial scripts to be
communicating that individuals should precisely adhere to the
socially imposed strictures of ethnoracial identities, even if they
are determined within the group, so Huey’s claim can be read as
a satire on ethnoracial nationalist claims over personal identity.
All the same, an important upshot of Huey’s injunction that
Jazmine adhere to the popular standard of group authenticity is
that it directly clashes with and rejects the veracity of Jazmine’s
claim of personal authenticity as a multiracial person.
To this the defenders of Jazmine’s ambiguous self-conception
retort that much of the discussion of the confusion around mixed
race looks, and perhaps the feelings of individuals like Jazmine, is
imposed from the social expectation of monoracial belonging and
the imposition of standards for behavior, scripts, for each of the
so-called ethnic groups and races in the United States. All this
talk, then, of racial confusion and disconnection (for example,
“Afro-Denial” and “Ethno-Ambiguo Hostility Syndrome”) is the
result of the Cindys and Hueys of the world with their suspect
categories and scripts, rather than the Jazmines.
Additionally, multiracial intellectuals and activists assertively
respond that multiracial persons should, for these reasons,
publicly resist monoracial scripts. The psychologist Maria P. P.
Root, in particular, claims that multiracial persons have the
“right” to refuse to “fragment, marginalize, or disconnect”
themselves from themselves or others, and that they have the
right “not to justify [their] experience to the world, not to keep
the races separate within [them],” and “not to be responsible for
people’s discomfort with [their] physical ambiguity.” [29]
Although her assertions can only metaphorically be connected
with human or civil “rights,” they are an expression of a negative
right—the right to be left alone—and may be thought of as
derivative of the freedom of conscience or association. Whatever
their grounding, these rights, along with the other eight that Root
provides in her “Bill of Rights for Racially Mixed People,” is an
assertion of psychological and moral freedom and distance from
the expectations of others. They are, moreover, consonant with
the modern expectations of self-fulfillment and self-expression
that has given rise to the ideal of authenticity and the resulting
expressive individualism that has dominated American popular
life. [30]
At best these mixed-race rights echo John Stuart Mill’s defense of
individuality and his ringing claim that, “Over himself, over his
own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.” [31] In their
most extreme form and, oddly enough, socially disconnected
versions, these “rights” are an absolute refusal of responsibility
(“I have the right not to be responsible for people’s discomfort”)
and are libertarian. [32]
Armed with these objections, Jazmine could tell Huey to back off,
and that any “Ethno-Ambiguo Hostility” is in fact being expressed
by him through his attempt to force her into “Afrocentric
wellness.” What is more, she may add, she refuses the
essentialist script that would have her paradoxically invent a
Nubian or African center within herself to discover, and stands by
“multiracial” or “biracial” as authentic markers of her experience.
Although she could concede that Huey is correct that others will
see her as simply black, she is not obligated to conform to their
judgment. She could even take a cue from Root and inform Huey
that he can set a good example for the intrusive majority, like
the oblivious Cindy, by keeping his ethnoracial identity to himself.
6. Everybody Is Doing It
Even so, no matter how much distance some multiracial
intellectuals and activists want to put between monoracial social
expectations and the experiences of multiracial persons, the
experience of ambiguity is a prominent part of multiracial
experience. Most multiracial persons experience this ambiguity,
deal with resulting conflicts, and incorporate them directly in their
identities. It is part of the lived experience of being multiracial.
[33] This is evident even in Root’s reaction to the monoracial
expectations that burden multiracial persons. While she declares
that multiracial persons have the right “not to justify [their]
existence in this world” and are not responsible for the discomfort
that their racial ambiguity causes in others, she also states that
multiracial persons have the right “to identify [themselves]
differently in different situations” and the right “to change [their]
identity over [their] lifetime—and more than once.” [34] Despite
the problems that judgments of ambiguity cause multiracial
persons, she recognizes that for a significant portion of the
multiracial population ambiguous mixed-race looks are an
element of the multiracial experience, so she is quick to defend
its protean possibilities.
Admitting the prominence of ambiguity for multiracial experience
is not to give too much to the critics’ accusation that multiracial
is a confused identity; instead it provides a solid reason to resist
their claims. As indicated from the start, the multiracial
experience is distinctive, so claims based on the normative
stereotype that multiracial persons take up the script of their
actual race, the group to which they really belong, is to beg the
question. The experiences of multiracial persons are great
evidence that they do not actually or really belong to those
groups in the simple ways that the public thinks that racial
membership functions.
Further, the authenticity of the multiracial experience begins a
response to the accusation of betrayal. As mentioned earlier,
public discussions of mixed-race looks are less about ahistorical
celebration than it is about coming to terms in racialized society
in which the scripts are visibly loosening. While the rhetoric about
mixed-race looks and self-acceptance may seem a little trite and
clichéd, it is in keeping with the trends in American popular
psychology. As such, the language of “mixed-race wellness” that
Jazmine gives the readers a taste of is but a development of the
same theme that “Afrocentric wellness” follows. Yes, it is
irritatingly simple-minded but it is not exceptional.
This retort, “everyone (including you) is doing it,” will not satisfy
critics, so a better response to worry of betrayal must be
formulated. A reasonable response arises from the distinction
drawn earlier between a Mill-inspired reading of Root’s rights for
mixed-race persons and a libertarian one. Mill’s view of self-
sovereignty follows from his principle that individuals should do
no harm to others; we are only sovereign in those parts of our
lives where we do no appreciable harm to others, the sort of
harm that drastically interferes with the autonomy of others and
infringes their rights. Thus, to live ethical lives we should be
vigilant about the many ways our actions affect others. The
libertarian view, in contrast, is radically individualistic and
assumes far more interpersonal disconnection: it is more callous
and willfully negligent about these effects. Multiracial individuals
and their advocacy groups should take Mill’s route.
Multiracial individuals should admit that they have a responsibility
to not harm others with the expressions of their identity or, more
germane to the issue at hand, in how they celebrate and affirm
mixed-race looks. This may seem odd and impractical because
“harm” in this context is vague and indeterminate. After all, the
opponents of multiracial identity claim that the simple public
acknowledgment of a separate multiracial identity harms the
interests of nonwhite monoracial groups. However, a comparison
with similar obligations regarding male gender identity may help
to clarify this point. For example, men have an obligation to
engender and perform a masculinity that does not harm women,
which can be delineated into specific injunctions against versions
of masculinity that contribute and encourage sexism and violence
against women. Likewise, multiracial individuals should not
promote or celebrate views of mixed-race looks that encourage
and contribute to racism, in particular, the view that darker skin
tones are inferior and the proper object of antipathy. [35]
7. Generously Listen
This anti-racist commitment does not entail that multiracial
identity should be suppressed. That request goes too far. Even if
the mere existence of individuals who proclaim multiracial
identities harms nonwhite group interests, the demand that
multiracial people just “get over it” and accept their membership
in a socially-designated monoracial group is unreasonable. It is
an attempt to exact conformity and, as such, offends individual
autonomy: it is an example of tyranny against the individual’s
sovereignty over his or her mind and body. It would, in an
unprecedented way, affirm that monoracial groups have
membership rights that trump individual rights (i.e., speech,
conscience, and association) and would preclude the right of
individuals to exit those groups.
Another option is to ask that multiracial persons strategically
identify with their non-white monoracial groups in those contexts
that matter, such as when encountering racism directed at those
groups, or when participating in an event where the mass of
spectators consider the monoracial identity of the participating
multiracial person or persons to be historically or politically
salient. What comes to mind here is the controversy over Tiger’s
Woods’s announcement on the Oprah Winfrey Show in 1997, at
the time he gained world fame as a preeminent American
professional golfer, that he was “Cablinasian” (a term he
constructed to denote his Caucasian, Black, Native American, and
Asian ancestry) rather than just African American. When
individuals who could otherwise exit the group or who, according
to presiding standards, do not even belong to the group, stand in
solidarity with an oppressed ethnoracial group, they stake an
ethical position and perform an invaluable political act that
advances the group’s interests. For example, when W. E. B. Du
Bois, the author of the Souls of Black Folk, together with other
leading African Americans at the beginning of the twentieth
century, appealed to African Americans to band together in black
associations for the sake of fighting racial oppression in the
United States and abroad, instead of pursuing the national
establishment of mulatto privilege, they sparked a movement
that would give birth to the U.S. civil rights movement and
organizations such as the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People and the Urban League. [36]
Voluntary acts of solidarity with an oppressed group are heroic
and invaluable, but they are also supererogatory: they go beyond
the call of duty. Ethnoracial groups that face racial injustice
should encourage and praise such acts. But they cannot be
required, because to do so would again offend personal autonomy
and disregard personal authenticity. Forced identification of
multiracial individuals with monoracial groups through public
policy should likewise be rejected; for example the refusal to
recognize and count multiracial persons in official racial statistics
in various institutions and programs, such as was the case with
U.S. census before 2000 and is still the case in several school
districts and universities. Such policies are like the U.S. military’s
policy of “don’t ask, don’t tell” for its homosexual and bisexual
service members. It ignores and suppresses internal divisions for
some greater good; in this case the good of suppressing
multiracial identity is the appearance of group solidarity.
However, these claims can be bottomless. (When exactly will the
U.S. military be ready to acknowledge its homosexual and
bisexual service members, and how will suppressing the
knowledge that they have been and are part of the military help?
). Individuals can both confront racism and “come out of the
closet” as multiracial. Hence, claims that multiracial persons
identify as monoracial for the sake of solidarity are politically
superfluous, too comprehensive, and fail to appreciate the moral
separateness of persons.
With this limit in place there are still challenges to the ethics of
multiracial identity, such as the worries expressed earlier about
commodification. What should multiracial individuals do about
that? Well, what can they do about it and is it their problem
alone? The commodification of mixed-race looks is a sliver of the
commodification of every aspect of life in the modern world.
Individuals have been massed into a number of target markets,
and products have been designed that are both directed at them
and reify them categories, as target markets. Worse, in the
process of being targeted for marketing, the public vision of these
groups is narrowed, stereotyped, and homogenized. This process
works on top of official census categories and the organizational
work of special interest groups. For example, where there were
once Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, Cuban Americans, and
Honduran Americans, there is now the Hispanic and Latino census
category and target market. [37]
Thus commodification is not unique to multiracial identity and its
commodification does not represent historical neglect, communal
betrayal, or racism. If there is an obligation to resist the
commodification of an identity, then it is a general obligation on
all persons and groups. Besides, whether the commodification of
any identity is a moral problem is controversial. While there is
general consensus that the commodification of persons is morally
wrong, such agreement about identities does not exist. If
anything, some nationalist groups see their identities as
commodities to be controlled for the profit of group members!
[38]
Critics of multiracialism, however, may still suspect that there is a
sinister social function in celebrations of mixed-race looks, and
suppose that participants in such affirmations are either
dishonest about the damage it does, or at least implicitly accept
racist aesthetic standards. In the eyes of such critics, affirming
the aesthetic qualities of mixed-race skin tones and hair texture,
or worse, receiving complements about those particulars, refers
to and supports an archive of past ideas and images loaded with
racial meaning determined by the history of racism. Just as
Jasmine, in the Boondocks comic strip, could be seen as an
analogous figure to Toni Morrison’s Pecola and the troubled
preadolescent girl from bell hooks’ Black Looks, affirmations or
celebrations of mixed-race looks are criticized as repetitions of
historical racist aesthetic judgments.
This is an unreasonable and cruel position to take. It is
unreasonable because it requires the meaning of myriad self-
presentational multiracial acts, and indeed the meaning of the
bodies of multiracial persons, to be unalterably set and
determined by the history of racism. Mixed-race looks must,
under this interpretation, carry a specific meaning and perform a
particular racial function: to be and to denote a racial median in
a racial hierarchy. Demands that mixed-race looks must or
necessarily function this way overreach because they preclude
shifts in the meaning of social acts and symbols. This position is
absurd. Language and culture simply do not work this way; the
meaning of social acts and symbols is not frozen in time or
intention.
This position is cruel because by freezing the meaning of mixed-
race looks it does not carve out a space for persons to ethically
recognize their multiracial identity. It is a suffocation of the
ethical viability of multiracial identity. Sections 5 and 6 of this
essay directly resist this chokehold by arguing that the self-
ascription of multiracial identity is best understood as an
expression of autonomy and personal authenticity.
Correspondingly, the affirmations of mixed-race looks are more
charitably seen as gestures of self-worth and self-respect. As was
seen from the early history of race, there has been a tendency,
exemplified by Bernier and Voltaire, to see multiracial persons as
exotic objects, as both sexually thrilling and politically dangerous,
and as epitomes of violations of sexual-racial taboos. The critics
of mixed race identity, curiously, have a similar one-dimensional
view of the self-descriptions and affirmations of multiracial
persons: as an epitome of the failure to stand in solidarity against
racism and perhaps including sexual-racial violation. The bodies
and self-ascriptions of multiracial persons are not so one-
dimensional and cannot be reduced to such psychological and
political caricatures.
What remains, then, is the obligation of multiracial individuals not
to harm monoracial groups in their representations and
celebrations of mixed-race looks. Multiracial individuals should
vigilantly guard against reinforcing racist standards of beauty
within their communities, for example, by directly confronting
and rejecting the racial skin-tone privilege, sometimes called
“colorism,” that has been historically associated with multiracial
identities, such as Creole or Mestizo. In addition to the acts of
resistance that are largely, and importantly, part of everyday life
(Jazmine confronts Cindy by coming out as partially black in
Boondocks), some representations of multiracial identity and
looks enter the public sphere as declarations of personal
authenticity and, while doing so, make anti-racist statements and
oppose the commodification of mixed-race looks. [39] The
production of such anti-racist representations of multiracial
identity is a salient feature of the multiracial movement’s strategy
for pubic recognition because it resists the severe consequences
of the commodification of mixed-race looks.
Even with those responses to charges of betrayal, opponents of
the emergence of multiracial identity and the public celebration of
mixed-race looks may not be satisfied. Although they are upset
about irresponsible celebrations of mixed-race looks, that is not
their only complaint: They want group solidarity. The expression
of a separate identity is within the rights of multiracial
individuals, but it will tend to disappoint the members of their
traditional communities—it will break their hearts. And
affirmations of mixed-race looks will feel like a betrayal, even if
they are not. Multiracial persons could at this point take the
libertarian option by turning their backs and walking away. A
wiser, moral response would reach beyond but not sacrifice self-
recognition; it would recognize the disappointment and pain that
authentic, ethical lives can still cause to others. This response
would necessarily involve a willingness to generously listen, the
humane recognition of loss, and the promise to be responsible.
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